In the context of these barriers, the two sides warily and somewhat blindly approached one another. Overly subtle and occasionally dismissed too hastily, Chinese overtures to the Americans often went unnoticed. American attempts, as the Warsaw fashion show revealed, were unsuccessful, and the Warsaw talk channel collapsed as a useful conduit not long after. 20 Kissinger realized that a limited number of secure interlocutors were needed for relaying a more overt message to the Chinese leadership. He quickly identified Romania, a communist country, and Pakistan as ideal nations through which to send messages. Neither nation was aligned with the United States, but both also had some contact with China and would not be seen as unconditional Soviet allies. In a series of preliminary exchanges, the United States communicated through Romania and Pakistan, and the PRC replied through Norway and Afghanistan. 21 Within a matter of months, a message came through from Premier Chou, inviting the United States to send a representative to Beijing. A subsequent message conveyed an invitation to Nixon. Chou wished to discuss Taiwan, but Nixon and Kissinger read more into his letter. 22 They replied, testing to see if Chou would be open to a broader agenda and received positive signs. Seeing the need for absolute secrecy, and fearful of the ideological objections of Secretary of State William Rogers and a range of likely domestic opponents, Kissinger boarded a plane in early July with a handful of aides and Secret Service agents, and set off on a routine diplomatic mission that would end in Pakistan. 23 At each stop the press lost interest in their mission, until the party, only some of whom knew more than part of what was up, could quietly board the president of Pakistan's plane and slip into China on July 9. 24 Meeting with Chou, he swiftly abandoned his prevailing assumption of Chinese hostility as his counterparts made great efforts to put him at ease. Initially concerned by the lack of scheduled time for negotiations, Kissinger realized that Mao and Chou's approach was not meant to placate him, but rather to signal a willingness to learn more about each other, especially fundamental views of the international system, after many years without direct communication.
In the formal negotiating sessions that followed, Kissinger and Chou discussed the two most pressing issues-Taiwan and Vietnam-but in terms favorable to both. Kissinger found an easy counterpart in Chou. Both negotiated their most important issues largely by talking around them, linking them to major priorities they both knew to be most significant. Kissinger tested Chou's desire to negotiate matters other than Taiwan, and received a favorable reply. Chou would negotiate Taiwan, but was not concerned by the order in which it would be negotiated. Other issues could come first. Kissinger saw an opportunity to link concessions on Vietnam to concessions on Taiwan, dubbing Chou's position, "linkage in reverse." 25 As his visit came to a close, Kissinger drafted an agreement with Chou, to be announced by the leaders of both nations. Knowing of Nixon's longstanding interest in China, Mao would extend an offer for a state visit. Richard Nixon would agree. The normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China was a prospect for the first time in twenty years. On July 15, both nations made the announcement. 26 Kissinger immediately set about planning an interim trip, during which the significant details of a communiqué would be prepared in advance of Nixon and Mao's formal negotiations. Returning to China in October, he found a much less harmonious capital. A shakeup in the leadership of the PRC had raised tensions as he set about negotiating the basis of the agreement. Kissinger reflected on his negotiations with Chou:
I soon found that the best way to deal with him was to present a reasonable position, explain it meticulously, and then stick to it. I sometimes went so far as to let him see the internal studies that supported our conclusions. Chou acted the same way; the suicidal method was sharp trading. On one occasion when negotiating the Shanghai Communiqué I objected to two sentences in the section of the communiqué explaining the Chinese point of view. Though we were not responsible for what the Chinese said, I thought that it would lead to controversy in a joint communiqué. I offered to give up two sentences in the section stating the American position in return. "Give your two sentences to your President if you wish," said Chou impatiently. "I do not want them. You do not have to trade; all you have to do is to convince me why our language is embarrassing." He was as good as his word; the most egregious passages disappeared. 27 At the outset, Kissinger proposed a relatively bland, formal unified statement on the shared positions of both nations. In return, he left the statement of a position on Taiwan blank to signal a willingness to shift the American position in order to find agreement with the PRC. Chou's reply was a firm rebuke. He demanded that each side state its positions, both common and conflicting, on key issues. Stunned at first, Kissinger realized that Chou's demand would not substantively alter either side's position going forward, but could limit internal dissent from hardliners. Kissinger later remarked on the unprecedented structure of the Shanghai Communiqué, completely unlike the relatively anodyne joint statements that often followed U.S.-Soviet meetings:
[The} Shanghai Communiqué . . . was to provide a road map for Sino-American relations for the next decade. The Communiqué had an unprecedented feature: more than half of it was devoted to stating the conflicting views of the two sides on ideology, international affairs, Vietnam, and Taiwan. In a curious way, the catalogue of disagreements conferred greater significance on those subjects on which the two sides agreed. . . . Stripped of diplomatic jargon, these agreements meant, at a minimum, that China would do nothing to exacerbate the situation in Indochina or Korea, that neither China nor the United States would cooperate with the Soviet bloc, and that both would oppose any attempt by any country to achieve domination of Asia. Since the Soviet Union was the only country capable of dominating Asia, a tacit alliance to block Soviet expansionism in Asia was coming into being. 28 Four months later, Nixon and Kissinger followed the preliminary meeting with a five-point statement on Taiwan, setting the stage for Nixon's state visit. Arriving in Beijing in late February, Nixon and Kissinger proceeded to the residence of Mao Zedong, and were greeted effusively by the ailing leader. Speaking in circuitous parables, questions, and statements, Mao invited negotiation with Nixon, signaling that no further agreement would be needed than the visit itself, should an agreement fail to be reached. In the long term, he conveyed, the two nations would draw together.
In the ensuing negotiations, Nixon and Mao talked extensively, educating one another about each other's positions, while leaving the detailed negotiations to Kissinger and Zhao. Within days, the Shanghai Communiqué was finally agreed upon, stating each side's positions, an agreed position, and a way forward on Taiwan. 29 In five points, the United States pledged to support a unified China with Taiwan, significantly reduce support for Taiwanese independence groups, gradually reduce U.S. military personnel in Taiwan, and encourage regional peace and security. 30 Moreover, both sides agreed to open formal diplomatic ties, and to avoid the pursuit of regional hegemony at all costs. 31 Kissinger later wrote that, " [d] espite occasional tensions, the Shanghai Communiqué has served its purpose." 32 Nixon's visit and the communiqué succeeded in achieved Kissinger's immediate goals, linking an agreement on Taiwan to a tacit agreement by the Chinese to cease supporting the North Vietnamese. Both sides stood to gain by checking the aggression of the Soviet Union, and by doing so in a way that deescalated a growing military crisis.
Not without its costs, the agreement necessitated an uncomfortable reorientation of American and Chinese interests away from allies in order to pursue long-term stability, and that stability remains tenuous four decades later. Nevertheless, Kissinger could confidently reflect that his efforts had a substantial longranging effect on relations between two of the world's largest nations. 33 The opening of China was, he later wrote, "one of the few occasions were a state visit brought about a seminal change in international affairs. The reentry of China into the global diplomatic game, and the increased strategic options for the United States, gave a new vitality and flexibility to the international system." 34 
Negotiating SALT I Within Détente
On January 20, 1969 Henry Kissinger assumed the post as National Security Advisor. That afternoon, President Richard M. Nixon had been sworn in to his first term. The task of crafting American national security policy was now Kissinger's responsibility. Of the many issues before him, nearly all connected to the bitter, decades-long ideological tensions between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Epitomized by the nuclear arms race, the Cold War imperiled all of human existence. As Kissinger reflected on the challenges ahead, the Soviets unexpectedly seemed to signal a willingness to begin negotiations on the mutual reduction of nuclear arsenals. For the first time in a generation, a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) appeared to be conceivable. 35 It would fall to Kissinger to make it a reality.
Negotiating SALT was an unprecedented opportunity and also an unenviable task. Over the preceding years, the United States had slipped behind the USSR in the arms race. In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson's administration had imposed a cap, limiting the American arsenal to 1054 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and 656 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). 36 Research and development for new weapons systems continued, but most projects would take years to produce tangible results. Out of concern that a Soviet strike could eliminate the potential for a counter-attack, the United States continued to develop defense systems, specifically Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (ABMs), but little else. While American weapons production stalled, the Soviets deployed new weapons at a growing pace. 37 It was evident to Kissinger that the Soviet arsenal could soon surpass the American one.
How to deal with the growing disparity remained a contentious issue within the government. Liberal leaders demanded that the United States unilaterally draw down its existing stockpiles of weapons and cancel expensive research and development programs. By contrast, conservatives and military leaders sought rapid expansion of the U.S. arsenal. 38 The dichotomy between the two sides reflected a larger Cold War political dynamic.
In late 1949, the Soviets had broken the American nuclear monopoly, succeeding in producing an atomic bomb, precipitating the arms race. Thereafter the relationship between the two powers had been characterized by the wholesale creation of weapons stockpiles and an escalation of tensions amidst a global standoff between both sides' proxies and allies. 39 Jockeying directly and indirectly for influence with other countries, the standoff sometimes exploded into open warfare, as in the case of the Korean War (1950-53), which claimed millions of lives. 40 By 1969 the distance and communication gap between the Soviets and Americans was so great that Kissinger remarked, "We had no good evidence concerning the attitudes of Soviet leaders […] and the distribution of power within the Soviet leadership." 41 He believed that a new way forward was needed, even if it meant going against prevailing wisdom, but the United States was in a difficult position.
Providing massive arms supplies to the North Vietnamese, the Soviets were contributing to a costly military quagmire in Southeast Asia that had radically destabilized the American political and social landscape at home. 42 Soviet support for Egypt threatened American allies and strategic energy interests in the Middle East. Moreover, each year the United States Congress reviewed the defense budget, including financial appropriations for nuclear weapons. With a Republican president in power, the Democraticcontrolled Congress appeared eager to cut the budget one program at a time, tying Nixon's hands as he contemplated negotiations. Kissinger believed that there was only a small window of time to negotiate before Congress began to defund programs needed for bargaining with the Soviets. 43 He also feared that the United States' was increasingly limited in its ability to counter a powerful Soviet advance.
In the face of these challenges, Kissinger proposed a deceptively simple strategy to Nixon. Unlike previous administrations, the United States would no longer rely on sending signals to the Soviets through unilateral actions, belligerent or otherwise. Nor would policies focus on influencing the internal power structure of the Soviets in order to gain advantage. 44 Instead, the United States would engage in a policy of détente; a systematic attempt to reduce tension between the U.S. and Soviets. To do so, the United States would pursue concrete agreements on a range of substantive issues at once. "The Soviet leadership," he later wrote, "would find the new Administration prepared to negotiate lasting settlements reflecting real interests." 45 Kissinger recognized that the Soviets had little desire to help the Americans find peace in Vietnam or reduce the threat of energy instability caused by ongoing disputes in the Middle East. Yet there were other issues where he saw that settling particular disputes was possible and could create opportunities for progress on negotiations that were deadlocked. He called this approach "linkage." 46 Visiting and revisiting the possibility for openings on various fronts, and using linkage to advance détente, Kissinger believed the United States could effectively deal with the Soviets. 47 Within weeks of the Soviet overture on SALT, Kissinger replied to his counterparts, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, but their response was cool and cautious. 48 Their apparent willingness to negotiate increasingly seemed to have been an attempt to sow discord among the Americans. In reality, fearful that a failed resumption of talks might encourage Nixon initiate a renewed U.S. commitment to producing weapons, the Soviets were concerned that an arms escalation would destabilize their already economically weakened government. In Kissinger's view, they had paid a price for their gains abroad and might benefit from agreements that would reduce higher long-term spending and bring much-needed revenue into their treasury.
In the face of Soviet reluctance, Kissinger pursued SALT, spearheading a newly created presidential panel on arms reduction in order to consolidate control over his many disparate and often disruptive American counterparts. He had frequent back and forth exchanges with Dobrynin and Gromyko. 49 A round of preliminary talks followed in November, 1970 in Helsinki, Finland, with the purpose of clarifying the two sides' positions. 50 The communication between both sides was encouraging, but Kissinger believed that firm proposals for an agreement continued to be too elusive.
Kissinger wanted an agreement to limit or freeze production and deployment of existing weapons and defense systems for five years, in part to allow the United States to develop new technologies and eliminate any Soviet military advantage. The Soviets wanted an agreement only on defensive Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, so that they could continue to deploy offensive weapons. Kissinger refused, but faced a significant problem. 51 The Soviets would not negotiate both issues in tandem, but wanted to negotiate ABMs first so that they could reach an agreement and then stall subsequent negotiations over offensive weapons production. After months of negotiating, Kissinger was able to get a Soviet agreement to consider negotiating the two issues as a de facto package in close proximity. 52 From there, the conversations stalled yet again, delayed by the Soviets, who felt that they could wait him out while U.S. domestic pressure built for "progress." 53 Even repeated attempts to arrange a date for a substantive negotiating summit proved elusive. Kissinger recognized that a different approach was needed.
In order to reach a satisfactory agreement, Kissinger began looking for issues of interest to the Soviets, for the purpose of linking them back to the SALT talks in ways that might precipitate movement. Where the United States was weakened by Vietnam and had only precarious access to key foreign oil sources, the Soviets were in desperate need of financial stability that could only come from increased trade with Europe and the United States. To Kissinger this meant that the most promising issue to link to SALT appeared to be the long-simmering dispute between the Soviets and the western Allies over the status of Germany. 54 Following the end of World War II, the four Allied powers-America, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain-maintained military control over Germany. In the subsequent decade, a democratic West German state emerged alongside a pro-communist, Soviet-backed East German state, and tensions quickly grew between the two. Berlin became the focus of these hostilities. 55 To ensure security, the three non-Soviet powers retained military control over West Berlin while East Berlin was walled off by the Soviets. As a military protectorate, West Berliners were not recognized as citizens of the Bonn-based Federal Republic of Germany. 56 Throughout the 1960s, with Berlin surrounded and supported by endangered supply lines, the West Germans and Allies refused to settle significant territorial disputes and wartime claims with the USSR. In turn, without a settlement, the Soviets' ability to trade with the Allies was severely restricted.
In 1969, West German Prime Minister Willy Brandt began a concerted effort to break the impasse with the East, proposing a series of treaties focused on reducing tensions by opening trade agreements, resolving disputed territorial claims, clarifying military arrangements, largely in an effort to keep the future possibility of a unified German state alive. 57 Brandt's Ostkpolitik would earn him the Nobel Peace Prize, but as Kissinger looked to dislodge the Soviets from their position on SALT, the United States opposed Brandt's strategy. Now Kissinger realized that it could be time to carefully lift American opposition to Ostpolitik, reaching an accord on the status of Berlin, ways to supply it, and possibilities to open trade with the East. 58 Negotiating quietly with Dobrynin, Kissinger created a back channel in order to test ideas and agreements and prevent disruption from other senior Nixon administration officials, especially William Rogers' State Department. 59 Only U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Rush, West German minister Egon Bahr, and Soviet Ambassadors Valentin Falin and Pyotr Abrasimov knew of the private discussions. Once items were settled in this back channel, these interlocutors would formally introduce them in public talks on Berlin. The "Channel," as it came to be known, was quite effective. The Soviets proved eager to negotiate on Berlin and West Germany, quickly seeking agreement and displaying a willingness to discuss SALT in return. Throughout the spring of 1971, the two sides negotiated ways to reach agreement while saving face, crafting solutions like granting West German passports to West Berliners in lieu of fully recognizing the territory as part of the Federal Republic. 60 Yet there were setbacks to Channel negotiations. In May, 1970, without sufficient trust between the two sides, the Soviets attempted destabilize Kissinger's position by having Abrasimov reveal back channel matters during open negotiations. Kissinger was furious. Confronting Dobrynin, he warned that Nixon preferred the back channel and would be enraged by their actions. As a punishment, he slowed negotiations at a critical moment, refusing to communicate with the Soviets to prove the point. If the Soviets tried it again, he told them the Americans would stop negotiating on Germany. 61 By early summer, the negotiations were once again on track and an agreement looked increasingly likely. The Soviets seemed eager, ceding most points on the status of Berlin. Yet when secretly agreed terms from the Channel were surfaced openly, U.S. officials treated the proposal as a starting place for negotiation, unaware that they were modifying a settled agreement. Kissinger and Dobrynin swiftly intervened, halted the negotiations, and reintroduced the Channel agreement, which was signed in September 3, 1971 . Reaching the agreement, however, meant that Kissinger had to reveal the existence of the Channel to his U.S. Government counterparts.
Indirectly related to SALT, the Berlin negotiations became a significant parallel track that had a noticeable impact on accelerating substantive nuclear arms talks. "Linkage was working," Kissinger reflected, "only amateurs believe in one-sided deals." 62 As the Berlin track of negotiations proceeded, more progress could be made on SALT.
By the summer of 1971, the Berlin talks had helped nudge the Soviets to agree to the de facto package, negotiating an offensive nuclear weapons treaty slightly prior to an ABM treaty. A summit was now needed in order to resolve three significant remaining issues: the duration of SALT's effectiveness, the number of SLBMs the Soviets would be required to dismantle, and the number of ABMs to be allowed. All of these required face-to-face negotiations. With each success on the German track, Kissinger urged the Soviets to set a summit date, but believing they had the, the Soviets stalled instead, steadfastly refusing to arrange a Moscow meeting. 63 In mid-July, the Soviets replied to Kissinger's most recent request for a summit date by making two demands while continuing to withhold a date. They told him that the United States must reach agreement on Berlin and must demonstrate a willingness to reduce tensions. 64 They did not know that Kissinger was in Beijing, preparing to reach an historic agreement to restore relations with the Chinese. When he replied to the new Soviet demands, it was thirty minutes before his public announcement of success in China. He told the Soviets that he had met their demands. An agreement on Berlin was coming, and now the United States was beginning to normalize relations with China, a significant counterpart, in order to de-escalate hostilities. It just so happened that the China deal threatened Soviet dominance. Kissinger had introduced China as yet another link; in short order, the Soviets proposed a date for the summit for the following year. 65 In the spring of 1972, Kissinger travelled to Moscow to prepare for the summit. For the first time he met directly with Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev, who had emerged from a power struggle as the most senior of the Soviet Union's powerful governing troika. To Kissinger's surprise, Brezhnev agreed to a five-year treaty, a reasonable negotiation of ABMs and the same limit on SLBMs as Kissinger's team had initially hoped to negotiate. As Kissinger departed for home, Brezhnev even provided him with a formal statement reiterating the basic framework for the May 23 Moscow summit. 66 Kissinger returned to the United States having advanced the SALT negotiations to a final round. Using the Channel, he had consolidated bureaucratic and political control of the negotiations on the U.S. side, managing the flow of critical information through his own team and crafting proposals outside of conventional thinking while maintaining a close connection with the President Nixon. In so doing, he prevented others, especially his rivals in Congress, political opponents, and Secretary of State Rogers from upsetting the delicate links he had forged between each set of issues. Increasingly, he was free to make decisions without intervention, even when his decisions raised alarm among fellow foreign policy officials and domestic constituencies. 67 The negotiation of SLBMs was perhaps most emblematic of Kissinger's freedom within the process. To many within the American foreign policy leadership, he appeared to make a terrible blunder early in negotiations with the Soviets, accepting the notion of a provision for freezing the production of offensive Copyright © 2016 James K. Sebenius SLBMs. Senior American military leaders were appalled, because they saw the production of SLBMs as vital. In actuality, Kissinger had made no mistake at all.
The Soviets were deploying one hundred new SLBMs each year. The United States was not deploying any. With a new SLBM program in development, the United States would not be able to deploy new weapons until 1978, one year after agreed end date of the treaty. Where others saw a miscalculation, Kissinger realized that, "for [the United States] the sacrifice was theoretical," and the gain was significant. 68 The United States would fall no further behind the Soviets in the production of actual armaments, while retaining the right to plan the development of new weapons that could be built after the expiration of SALT. 69 Negotiating in Moscow, agreement was steadily reached on the freezing of ICBM development, dismantling of SLBMs and other weapons, and a limitation on ABMs. As agreed, the treaty would last for five years. All that remained was agreement on limiting the size of missile silos. At a critical moment, Kissinger reminded his Soviet counterparts that any delay would go against the previously expressed views of their own Premier. Brezhnev had asked that the negotiations conclude by May 26. The last impasse was quickly surmounted and an agreement on SALT was reached in time for a Soviet state dinner on Friday, May 26, 1972. 70 In a negotiation lasting over two and a half years, Kissinger created potential for a deal by allowing the implicit threat of increased U.S. arms production to persist while linking SALT to negotiations in over trade, the status of Germany, and relations with China where none had previously existed. There were certainly drawbacks to his approach. He later reflected that the process, especially the Channel was imperfect. It freed him from the cumbersome, overly-ideological, and slow-moving bureaucracy of government, but also placed a large burden on him and his staff, and made it difficult for him to gain the support-or potentially useful perspectives--from other government officials on matters that ultimately required public, official assent. 71 Yet the outcomes also affirmed the success of his efforts. SALT I was a defining agreement of the Cold War and one of the most significant disarmament treaties in modern history. Its stipulations ultimately paved the way for future treaties on nuclear disarmament, including SALT II, an agreement signed by President Jimmy Carter in 1979, though not ratified by the U.S. Congress, banning most new missile production by the United States and the Soviet Union. 72 Kissinger's approach to linkage and the resulting SALT agreement generated significant opposition both among conservatives and liberals in the United States, but achieved the fundamental aims of détente. As a result, his actions reconfigured a previously unsuccessful American foreign policy that had been mired in recriminations over Vietnam, redefined black and white conceptions that had dominated U.S.-Soviet as well as U.S. Chinese relations, and froze substantial Soviet weapons development. Kissinger could reflect that, "Never before have the world's two most powerful nations, divided by ideology, history and conflicting interests, placed their central armaments under formally agreed limitation and restraint." 73 These actions, set in motion by SALT and Berlin, and boosted by the Nixon-Kissinger Chinese initiative, set the stage for the United States ultimately to take a dominant role in ending the Cold War. 74 
SALT II
Given the successes of détente and the SALT I negotiations, there was momentum and support for continued SALT II negotiations by senior American officials in the late spring of 1972. Despite support for continued talks, there were significant divisions within the Nixon Administration regarding the formal position the United States should put forward.
Defense Department officials favored an agreement that would equalize American and Soviet weapons development. State Department officials preferred a position urging freezes on weapons development. Facing the beginning stages of the Watergate controversy that would lead to his resignation, Richard Nixon delegated the decision-making to a reluctant National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, whose task to resolve the positions and put forward a unified opening position. 75 Kissinger refused to take the onus entirely upon himself, noting that, "Presidential assistants can be powerful in influencing Presidential decisions; they cannot make the decisions, especially when major departments have strong convictions." 76 The convictions of the departments were particularly strong due to Kissinger's mounting record of achieving major negotiated agreements largely in secret. As result, the two positions Kissinger was confronted with were maximalist, and in his view, largely irreconcilable. 77 The State Department's proposal to ban multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) weapons testing would, in his opinion, be unacceptable to the Soviets at the outset, since they had not yet had the chance to develop one. The position would also endanger American development of the Trident missile. 78 This was particularly concerning to Kissinger because conventional forces were already in steep decline, giving the Soviets a natural advantage. 79 Kissinger believed that the Defense Department position was equally untenable. For years, the United States had pursued asymmetrical warfare strategies in their nuclear and related development programs. The department's new proposal, calling for an equalization of weapons on a weapon-by-weapon basis was tantamount to a complete reversal of this policy. Kissinger saw it as foolhardy and impossible, especially given the department's demand that no firm accounting of American weapons be presented to the Soviets for negotiation. With no numbers on the table, he could not conceive of how to achieve the equalization they sought. 80 Moreover, Kissinger was alarmed to discover that the Defense Department was simultaneously decommissioning weapons that could be used for bargaining in the SALT talks, effectively giving concessions to the Soviets that created a disincentive for a strong agreement.
Nevertheless, negotiations commenced in October 1972 with the Soviets putting forward an opening offer to restrict weapons development and have the United States pull ballistic missiles from its forward bases. 81 Unable to come up with a reasonable counteroffer, Kissinger stalled for time. He asked for a November 8 "exploratory" meeting with the Soviets to better understand their position. For six months thereafter, he and his team avoided returning to negotiations while they attempted to come up with a position. 82 As pressure mounted on Nixon, Kissinger was dismayed to find the president unable to broker a compromise between his secretaries. To his relief, however, he came to realize that the Soviets seemed equally disinterested in renewed SALT negotiations. 83 Instead, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was placing all of his energy into negotiations to reach an Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear war. Kissinger observed that Brezhnev only appeared to care for the SALT negotiations when and where they might create leverage for the other nuclear agreement. 84 The Soviets put forward a renewed offer in the spring of 1973, calling for a ban on all new strategic weapons development, but allowing for improvements to existing technology, which they claimed included all of their current test missiles. 85 Still unable to put forward a credible counter-offer, Kissinger chose instead to put forward a document that reflected the interests of all of the stakeholders. His May 3, 1973 offer called on the Soviets to stop all forms of weapons development while placing no restrictions on the United States. In addition, the proposal called for the Soviets to give up more than 5,000 warheads in return for only 450 American missiles. The Soviets made no reply to the offer. 86 Having traded offers in April and May, the talks stalled with no agreement. Instead, the two sides issued a joint statement of "general principles" in which they affirmed the right of both nations to pursue "equal security," and agreed to reach an agreement on strategic arms by the end of 1974, a condition that was ultimately satisfied by the Vladivostok agreement. 87 SALT II was ultimately negotiated and signed by President Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in July 1977, however it was never ratified, by mutual agreement of Carter and the United States Congress. 88 Kissinger reflected that the failure to negotiate SALT II came about because, "Our deliberations neither rose to a true analysis of our long-term strategy nor addressed the fundamental question of whether a SALT negotiation was the right way to deal with our emerging security problems." 89 In the end, it was not a failure to reach an agreement with the Soviets that had doomed his efforts. Rather, he wrote, "we had explicitly failed to reach an internal agreement." 90 
Sinai I and Mideast Peace
In October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a full-scale military attack against Israel six years after their humiliating defeat in the 1967 War. Caught by surprise on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish year, Israeli forces were steadily pushed back from their positions. Many Israelis feared the destruction of their state before their armed forces regained ground and defeated both Arab armies. In the east, Israeli troops reached the outskirts of the Syrian capitol, Damascus. In the west, they surrounded Egypt's entire Third Army, only 101 kilometers from Cairo. By the end of the month, two resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council resulted in a ceasefire. Egyptian and Israeli generals met at the front to discuss disengagement. For both sides the war was a partial victory at best: partially redeeming their near-total defeat in the 1967 war, the Arab armies had surprised Israel and inflicted heavy losses while the Israeli counterattack eventually prevailed. 91 For Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State, this situation presented a major opportunity. 92 Following the ceasefire, multi-party talks convened in Geneva to hammer out a long-term solution to the Mideast conflict. Egyptian and Israeli negotiators were joined by their Cold War patrons, the Soviet Union and the United States, but Syrian leaders refused to participate and the talks collapsed in early January 1974. 93 Kissinger had correctly anticipated that multi-party talks would fail. Since early November, he had believed that an agreement for long-term stability in the region was possible only if the United States single-handedly brokered small, meaningful, incremental agreements between the Israelis and Egyptians. 94 Prepared to take the precarious role of sole mediator, Kissinger planned to use the process not only to reach agreements among the combatants, but to achieve a major geopolitical objective: to displace the Soviet Union from its Middle Eastern sphere of influence. Until the outbreak of war, the Soviets had used the years-long stalemate between the Arabs and Israelis to cultivate alliances with Arab nations, encouraging a status quo that effectively blocked the United States from gaining influence in the region. The war had suddenly dislodged the Arabs and Israelis from their positions. In its wake, Kissinger sensed an emerging opportunity if he could successfully pursue an agreement that largely met both sides' interests. He later explained If the United States played its cards carefully, either the Soviet Union would be obliged to contribute to a genuine solution or one of its Arab clients would break ranks and begin moving toward the United States. In either case, Soviet influence among the radical Arab states would be reduced. This was why, early in Nixon's first term, I felt confident enough to tell a journalist that the new administration would seek to expel Soviet influence from the Middle East. Though that incautious remark created a furor, it accurately described the strategy the Nixon Administration was about to implement. 95 Kissinger's optimism about realizing these audacious goals was based on a careful assessment of each side's strengths and weaknesses. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat were powerful and effective leaders and both had made gains in the October war. Despite the subsequent losses, Sadat showed that he was the de facto leader of the Arab Middle East, capable of coordinating a multinational military assault that unified Arab nations, catching the Israelis entirely by surprise. In turn, Meir proved that Israel could defeat its enemies and even gain territory in the face of such a stunning initial setback. Israel now held the entirety of the Sinai desert, which had belonged to Egypt until the 1967 war. Despite these successes, Kissinger knew that both sides had emerged from the war in precarious positions.
The Israelis prided themselves on a robust policy of pre-emptive warfare, and were deeply shaken by the effectiveness of the Syrian and Egyptian surprise attack. Sadat had lost vital territory, and needed to grapple with issues that facing the long-term stability of a nation already beset upon by significant economic difficulties. Humbled by the inconclusive outcome, both sides faced long-term unrest within and across their borders, unless they could arrive at a diplomatic easing of relations.
In a moment of crisis following the war, Golda Meir's formerly powerful government coalition collapsed. A new government and parliament (Knesset) would take office at the end of January. Often comprised of unstable coalitions, Israeli cabinets were notoriously unstable and difficult to work with, but Kissinger observed that during times of transition, factionalism might give way to near-unanimity on significant issues. If the Israelis could be induced to make an offer on Sinai disengagement, he believed that Sadat would agree in the interests of long-term stability. 96 Meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Kissinger explored the possibility of an Israeli disengagement proposal. Dayan obliged, offering a hard line proposal, but one that Kissinger felt he could deliver to Sadat, albeit uncomfortably, in order to determine whether the Egyptian President would be amenable to further talks. 97 Arriving at Sadat's winter residence in Aswan late in the evening on January 11, he was quickly ushered in to meet with the President. Little more than two months earlier, Kissinger had set foot on the soil of an Arab nation for the first time. 98 Now, he and the Egyptian president spoke frankly with one another. Weeks earlier in Geneva, Sadat had hinted that if presented with a suitable agreement, he might go so far as re-opening the long-closed Suez Canal, a major concession to the Israelis. Now, he was prepared to do even more. 99 Beyond a disengagement proposal, Sadat told Kissinger that he intended to travel internationally on the 18th of January. He hoped to have a diplomatic victory in hand and to link it to his initial military success in the October war. He told Kissinger that he would support every effort to reach an agreement in just seven days, and hoped the Secretary of State would act as the intermediary. In return, he offered to pressure Arab leaders to ease their oil embargo of the United States, begun during the October war. 100 Kissinger was surprised, pleased, and wary all at once. He later reflected, "In my view, the Secretary of State should not, as a general rule, go abroad on a serious negotiation unless the odds are heavily in his favor. Since in diplomacy the margins of decisions are narrow, the psychological element can be of great consequence. A reputation for success tends to be self-fulfilling. Equally, failure feeds on itself: A Secretary of State who undertakes too many journeys that lead nowhere depreciates his coin. And it is dangerous to rely on personality or negotiating skill to break deadlocks; they cannot redeem the shortcomings of an illconsidered strategy." 101 Despite the risks, the window of opportunity was too great. Kissinger accepted Sadat's proposal.
Kissinger returned to Israel with Sadat's offer in hand. In return he requested that the Israelis make a new proposal, more forthcoming than Dayan's original demands. The Israelis obliged, but handed Kissinger an even more austere proposal, telling him that the Dayan plan could be their fallback position. Kissinger was not amused. He argued that any proposal that could not be sold to a nation's people should not be seriously proposed to their leader. Access to Sadat, without the impediment of intermediaries, was already a concession. He would convey either side's proposals honestly, but he would not be set up to fail and be blamed. 102 Returning to the Tel Aviv airport, Undersecretary of State Joe Sisco joked with Kissinger, "Welcome to the Egyptian-Israeli shuttle!" 103 Shuttle diplomacy, in which a negotiator moves back and forth between parties who will not or cannot meet face-to-face, ensued. Kissinger used the shuttle to create momentum for an agreement. He arrived late in the evening, often intentionally too late to negotiate, worked even later into the night, presented plans early in the mornings, and indefatigably wrote, revised, and redrafted proposals and agreements. 104 He encouraged a sense of momentum to develop between the parties, pushing beyond exhaustion, seeking the exact moments to withhold and reveal each side's demands and concessions. Focused on details as minute as individual troop placements, Kissinger even delayed landing his plane in Egypt while he worked, circling above the airport, to ensure the proper preparation of a proposal. 105 Fearful of any disruption, Kissinger sometimes even kept the White House at bay. When President Nixon, embattled by the Watergate scandal, got word that an agreement might be close, he requested that Kissinger return to the United States in order to publicly announce the potential impending agreement. Kissinger refused, telling the President that he would not leave until an agreement was signed. 106 As he travelled back and forth, Kissinger also steadfastly maintained an eye on his own standing. The fact that October war had ended in need of a diplomatic outcome-rather than in a bloody fight to the finish-was testament to the success of détente, which had curtailed military support from the Americans and Soviets to the Israelis and Egyptians respectively. Now Kissinger used the shuttle and the weakened ties between the Soviets and Egyptians to dislodge the U.S.S.R. completely from that part of the region. He avoided arousing undue suspicion by sending non-descript updates to the Soviets by way of a senior national security aide, Brent Scowcroft. 107 As January 18th neared, Kissinger narrowed the terms of an agreement. Both sides made significant concessions and a final proposal emerged. Egypt gained concessions to retain troops east of the Nile. Israel maintained control of the only major north-south road from its territory into the Sinai. Both sides agreed to an uneasy 30 km buffer zone, nearly out of easy striking distance for either military. 108 With documents shuttling back and forth in the hands of the Secretary of State, both sides allowed Kissinger to arrange two tracks of agreement. A formal, detailed document was developed for both sides to sign. Simultaneously, Kissinger secured Nixon's agreement to draft letters to both sides confirming Israeli and Egyptian commitments to significant concessions that could not be fully detailed without both sides losing face with their own constituencies. 109 Most importantly these included an Egyptian willingness to clear the Suez Canal and an Israeli agreement to reduce or cease hostilities. 110 On January 17 th , Kissinger arrived in Jerusalem during the first snowfall in decades. 111 He went to Golda Meir's residence with a proposal, approved by her cabinet. The ailing Prime Minister promised to take the agreement to conclusion personally and drafted a letter of gratitude to her Egyptian counterpart. For the first time in two decades, Israel had ceded land for peace. 112 The next morning, seven days after Sadat's ultimatum, Kissinger delivered the agreement at Aswan while representatives of both governments signed it at the 101 kilometer marker where the war had ended. Reading Meir's letter, Sadat turned to Kissinger saying, "I am today taking off my military uniform-I never expect to wear it again except for ceremonial occasions. Tell her [Golda] that is the answer to her letter." 113 Significant issues remained unresolved, most importantly an agreement for formal cessation of hostilities between Israel and Egypt. Yet the Sinai accords set in motion a series of agreements and commitments between Israel and Egypt that continued over the ensuing six years. Undertaken at significant cost, sometimes with deep misgivings, those agreements would directly lead to the assassination of Sadat in 1981. Despite the evident threat to their lives as they proceeded, they did so nonetheless, at many points affirming Kissinger's initial inclination that peace could be found, and culminating half a decade later with the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty.
The Israel-Syria Separation of Forces Agreement (1974)
With the signing of the January 1974 Sinai disengagement agreement, Egypt and Israel agreed to terms that would foster a lasting peace on that front in the wake of the Yom Kippur War. Yet violence continued along Israel's northern border, where Syria and Israel remained locked in a simmering standoff.
Syria's territorial losses from the October War were significant, compounded by a prior defeat during the 1967 war with Israel. 114 After suffering early setbacks, Israeli troops had poured back across the Golan Heights along the border, and were now at a standstill, poised as close as twenty miles from the Syria's capitol, Damascus. 115 When Syria refused an Israeli demand for the release of prisoners of war, Israel refused to concede territory that Syria wanted back. 116 Amidst fears of renewed open warfare, skirmishes were on the rise.
Henry Kissinger understood that a peace agreement between Syria and Israel was necessary in order to stabilize the region and reduce tensions. Israel would have to concede many of its gains and Syria would have to match those concessions through direct negotiations, after more than a quarter century of refusing to recognize the Jewish state's existence. Yet, Kissinger knew that both countries had powerful constituencies who could pressure their weakened leaders to oppose negotiations.
Hailed at first for having won the war and for reaching the accord with Egypt, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was now blamed for having missed early warnings of the surprise attack. In early March, Meir resigned her post only to be called back, but she remained embattled. 117 Across the border, the powerful and savvy Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was under pressure as well, having sustained a humiliating military defeat. Assad governed ruthlessly, later killing 10-25,000 of his own citizens in the city of Hama, but he was also a prominent figure among Arab leaders and known for his shrewd understanding of international politics. 118 Even so, Kissinger was unsure whether the Syrian leader would accept conditions for a negotiation.
It was an equally challenging time for Kissinger. President Richard Nixon's attempts to spy on his opponents had been discovered during a botched break-in at the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. His actions, and the subsequent cover-up, were the subject of a growing national uproar and a congressional investigation that increasingly threatened to lead to impeachment proceedings. 119 Kissinger nevertheless sought to capitalize on the momentum of his successful shuttle negotiations in the Sinai, putting forward a plan to end the Syrian standoff. The plan included proposals for each side to provide a list of prisoners of war and the creation of a framework for multilateral security negotiations to take place in Geneva. 120 In return for his participation, Kissinger hoped to persuade Arab oil ministers to end a punishing embargo they had initiated through the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) during the Yom Kippur War. 121 In February, Kissinger returned to the Middle East to gauge conditions for a negotiation. While there, and in subsequent meetings in Washington D.C., he found that both sides were cautiously amenable to a direct shuttle conducted personally by him. Kissinger was surprised. Syria was a close client state of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Ambassador to the United States had been very clear that he expected Soviet participation to be a cornerstone of any negotiations. 122 He understood that the stakes would be higher for a lone American mediator, but that it was also an opportunity to further achieve the goal of reducing Soviet influence in the region.
On March 18, the oil embargo was temporarily lifted, and with it, Kissinger flung himself into his second shuttle in a year. 123 As he considered how to approach the negotiations, Kissinger was wary of mimicking the Sinai shuttle. "The Sinai disengagement had worked rapidly," he later reflected, "because both sides were eager for an accord." "Neither the compulsions nor the convictions existed on the Syrian front. Both Syria and Israelcertainly Israel -considered the military situation quite tolerable. Neither believed that it was starting a new, much less an irreversible, process. […] Assad was claiming in the negotiation what he had not achieved on the battlefield. To the Israelis, a Golan disengagement looked suspiciously like a unilateral withdrawal to enable Assad to proclaim that Syria had not fought in vain -not a compelling goal for the victim of surprise attack." 124 With only a few months' time until the oil embargo might be renewed, Kissinger's window of opportunity to negotiate an agreement was not without its risks. As he made his preparations, Meir's government collapsed again. In mid-April she announced that she would step down for good, pending the formation of a new government. She would conduct negotiations as a lame duck. 125 In the United States, Nixon's situation grew more precarious with the release of the Watergate tapes. 126 Yet Kissinger continued to see the possibility for a sustainable agreement based on a careful and deliberate Israeli withdrawal.
Israel's willingness to pull back was constrained by the presence of Israeli settlements and farmland that had been constructed on formerly Syrian territory, lost in the 1967 war. Israel would not consider giving them up, but Kissinger found potential for agreement if Israel withdrew from lands captured in 1973 and also included the now-abandoned Syrian border town of Quneitra, which had been taken in 1967. 127 The regional Syrian capitol, Quneitra had been home to tens of thousands of now-displaced Syrians. Located along the Syrian border, the town and the area surrounding it could provide the basis for a symbolically and strategically significant compromise for both sides.
If Israeli troops pulled back, they could continue to occupy nearby Mount Hermon, a militarily advantageous range of nearby hills and mountains overlooking the plateau of Syrian territory to the East. Meanwhile, the return of Syrian refugees to their homes could give Assad a symbolically meaningful victory. Along with an agreement to control the flow of weapons to either side, a similar balance as the one reached in the Sinai might be possible. Significant questions remained about whether the Israelis would be willing to give up land, whether it would be enough to satisfy the Syrians, and whether or not a means of exchanging prisoners could be reached even if territorial concessions were made.
Before travelling to Israel, he flew to Algeria and Egypt, consulting with the presidents of both countries. 128 With their encouragement, he remained hopeful as he entered the first round of negotiations with Meir on May 2. 129 Instead, Kissinger found Meir surrounded by aides and advisors, many of whom, he surmised, were opponents of any negotiated deal with Syria. 130 Meir agreed, in principle, to many of the initial terms of an agreement, but insisted on splitting control of Quneitra with a separation line. Kissinger was pleased that the Israelis would consider discussing Quneitra, but also knew that Assad would reject the proposal to split the city outright, so he suggested an approach drawn from the Sinai shuttle. He asked that the Israelis come up with a better offer. Until they did, he promised to tell Assad that they had not yet reached a point of having a specific position to put forward. 131 When he arrived in Syria, Kissinger was equally challenged by Assad, whose lengthy negotiating sessions touched on dozens of issues but rarely those of importance in any substantial or direct fashion until very late in the conversations. 132 Like Meir, Assad drove a hard bargain, demanding that Israel give up half the Golan Heights. 133 For weeks, Kissinger shuttled back-and-forth, trying to draw together the hardened positions of each side, yet no agreement emerged. In Israel, protestors assailed Meir and Kissinger alike. 134 In Syria, Assad warned Kissinger that he was in a precarious position for negotiating with the Israelis at all. 135 Two weeks into the negotiations, Kissinger had succeeded in narrowing the focus of the negotiations to the fate of Quneitra, but could not get either side to agree on what that fate might be. One of his aides, diplomat Harold Saunders, recounted the exhausting preparations made in advance of each shuttle, so that Kissinger could respond to the unique challenges that might arise in any given discussion. In order to persuade Meir, Saunders recalled, " [Kissinger] stopped being the Secretary of State of the United States, who was trying to mediate an agreement. He became Doctor Kissinger, an American professor serving as a consultant to the State of Israel, who, incidentally, had shared the Jewish experience. This metamorphosis was done in a very impressive, subtle and admirable fashion. Everything he did was perfectly proper, but somehow he managed to change from his official role as a mediator to that of a counselor." 136 Nixon, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and others, supported his efforts, but despite the painstaking progress, he was ready to give up. 137 On May 15, an attack by the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the northern Israeli town of Ma'alot led to a standoff in which 16 Israelis children were killed by the terrorists. 138 Meir's cabinet was consumed by the attack.
Just as a deal seemed completely out of reach, however, Assad asked Kissinger to stay on. At the same time, Meir's aide, Simcha Dinitz paid the secretary a private visit and confided in him a piece of crucial information. Dinitz informed Kissinger that the reason the Israelis were refusing to fully evacuate Quneitra was because of its strategic location, which allowed them to maintain a military advantage over the Syrians without having to acknowledge that they otherwise lacked sufficient troops to maintain security along the border. 139 Kissinger reflected, "how much better it would have been," if the Israelis had been forthcoming at the outset, but it was enough to persuade him to continue at an important moment. 140 He decided to jumpstart the negotiations by presenting, for the first time, a "United States proposal," instead of presenting Israeli and Syrian offers and counter-offers to each side. 141 The proposal moved the parties closer to an agreement, and persuaded the Israelis to consider, at long last, a withdrawal beyond the outskirts of Quneitra. For the first time in its history, Israel would cede cultivated fields and lands, but would retain three strategically important hills overlooking the city. 142 Still, the two sides remained divided over how to handle cross-border terror and attacks, should they occur. Kissinger aggressively lobbied both sides, doing everything at his disposal to reach an agreement. 143 Yet he was also careful to ensure his credibility, presenting equal offers to each side, trying to find how, "why an agreed goal [could] be in the common interest for different purposes." 144 The negotiations continued-a test of wills more than an argument over substance. In five days at the end of May, Kissinger spent fifty hours in talks with Israelis and Syrians. 145 By May 26, an agreement was within reach. Kissinger proposed a cease-fire that would include an American-backed provision for opposing "guerilla actions." Twenty-four hours later, an agreement was drafted, including provisions for Israel's withdrawal to the outskirts of Quneitra, a timeline, and requirements for limitation of arms. In a final, hours-long negotiation with Assad, concessions were made, and an agreement was reached. 146 Meir presented the proposal to the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, on May 30, and despite some objections, it was approve and signed by Israel and Syria on May 31, 1974. 147 Within days, a new cabinet was formed and Golda Meir stepped down as Prime Minister. 148 Henry Kissinger returned to the United States having been abroad for the longest continuous period of time of any Secretary of State since the end of World War I. 149 The provisions of the agreement allowed for an exchange for prisoners, and a buffer zone, in addition to setting the line outside Quneitra and allowing for Israeli positions at Mount Hermon. 150 Four decades after it was signed, it remains in effect.
Nixon reveled in the news of Kissinger's success. Throughout the negotiations he had tried to insert himself in the details, in part as a distraction from his ongoing troubles at home, and also out jealousy and resentment for Kissinger's success. As the negotiations came to a close, however, impeachment proceedings were underway in the United States House of Representatives. By the end of the summer, the president was forced to resign from office, handing the reins to Vice President Gerald Ford. 151 Copyright © 2016 James K. Sebenius 
The Paris Peace Accords (1973)
The signing of the Paris Peace Accords, officially called the "Agreement Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam," on January 27, 1973 marked a formal end to the agonizing war, which had claimed over 58,000 American and roughly 1,000,000 Vietnamese lives, left several hundred thousand Americans wounded, and deeply divided American society. 152 Two series of separate negotiations-one public, one secret-focused on ending the Vietnam War. The public sessions were attended by representatives of four parties: (1) the United States, (2) North Vietnam, (3) South Vietnam, and (4) the National Front for the Liberation of the South (or Vietcong). 153 These sessions convened for the first time in January 1969. 154 The signing of the Paris Peace Accords was one of the few productive sessions of these public peace talks; the previous 174 plenary meetings yielded virtually no results. 155 In parallel with these public talks, secret negotiations commenced in Paris, starting in February 1970. U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho served as the dominant negotiators. 156 These secret negotiations ultimately produced the substantive breakthroughs that led to the Paris Peace Accords. (See Table 1 for a schematic of the public and secret talks.)
Along with President Nixon, Kissinger confronted three broad challenges as he led a "negotiation campaign" to achieve an acceptable outcome to the Vietnam War. 157 First, he had to overcome unrelenting military efforts by the North Vietnamese to vanquish South Vietnam and persuade that party that genuine negotiations were in its interest. Second, he sought to respond to increasingly insistent pressure from Congress and domestic anti-war protesters to withdraw entirely from Indochina. 158 Third, for any agreement short of the military victory the South Vietnamese fervently pursued, Kissinger would have to persuade a most reluctant South Vietnamese President Thieu to accept it.
From Truman to Johnson
Occupied by Japan during the Second World War, Indochina was a French colony of some 42 million people. With post-war Vietnam back under French rule, communist guerillas waged an anti-colonial struggle for independence with support from Communist China. 159 After the onset of the Korean War in 1950 and following what came to be known as "domino theory," President Harry Truman began aiding France in the war in Indochina. In the context of the Cold War, this theory suggested that once one country fell under Communist control, other Communist "dominoes" in the region would follow. The strategic implication was that the spread of Communist influence had to be resisted even in areas that did not otherwise have significant strategic importance to the United States. Following its defeat at Dien Bien Phu, France withdrew from Vietnam upon the signing of the July 20, 1954 Geneva Accords, which divided Vietnam at the 17 th parallel. 160 In October 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem was elected President of South Vietnam. The United States recognized South Vietnam and by the end of the Eisenhower Administration had provided over $1 billion in assistance, with 692 U.S. military advisors helping train the South Vietnamese Army. 161 Seeking to contain the spread of communism-by then, the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy-President John F. Kennedy increased the U.S. presence in Vietnam from 900 to 16,263 military advisors. 162 By 1963, Diem was deposed and killed in a U.S.-condoned coup. 163 General Nguyen Van Thieu, one of the coup leaders, became President of South Vietnam in 1967. 164 Following John F. Kennedy's assassination, Lyndon Johnson was elected President in 1964 with the largest popular vote in U.S. history. In August 1964 Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which later became quite controversial, authorizing President Johnson to use force to restore peace in Indochina. 165 Although the U.S. public and policymaking community had generally regarded Communist countries as monolithic during the 1950s and 60s, relations between the USSR and China became increasingly tense through the 1960s. 166 The "Sino-Soviet split" worked mostly in Hanoi's favor as the Soviet Union and China competed for the position of North Vietnam's primary supporter. 167 169 The Soviet Union's support-$365 million-from 1954 to 1964 was more modest than Beijing's, reflecting Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's belief that Indochina was a low strategic priority compared to the post-war settlement of Germany and the emerging China challenge. 170 Leonid Brezhnev's assumption of power in October 1964 marked a change in Moscow's approach. 171 As the Sino-Soviet split deepened, it became "critically important [for Moscow] to reverse the pro-Chinese trend in Hanoi." 172 Embroiling the United States in a protracted struggle that drained its resources and attention was an added advantage that the Soviet leadership sought to exploit. 173 In 1965, Hanoi rejected Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai's request that North Vietnam dissociate itself from Moscow, and accepted some $550 million-worth of Soviet military assistance. 174 In 1965, reassured of continued Soviet and Chinese support, Ho Chi Minh launched the offensive against the South Vietnamese city of Pleiku, which marked the beginning of the U.S. war in Vietnam by triggering the U.S. "Rolling Thunder" bombing campaign, arguably authorized by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 175 The first U.S. combat troops were also deployed to Vietnam that year. 176 A wave of public anti-war protests greeted the bombing campaign and escalation of the U.S. military role. 177 Frustrated by his inability to bring the conflict to an end and facing a huge domestic backlash against the war President Johnson announced in March 1968 that he would not seek reelection.
Nixon and Kissinger. Richard Nixon was elected President in 1968 in the widespread expectation that he would end the deeply unpopular war in which almost 550,000 Americans were serving and 35,000 had already died. 178 On December 20, 1968, the United States expressed readiness to seek a settlement. 179 The North Vietnamese responded with an ultimatum: all U.S. forces were to leave Vietnam, after the United States forcibly deposed the South Vietnamese government. 180 As President Nixon's National Security Adviser, Kissinger judged that, if fulfilled, Hanoi's demand to turn on an ally would deal a severe blow to the U.S. credibility worldwide.
In tandem with these opening negotiation moves, Nixon approved Operation Menu-a bombing campaign against North Vietnamese sanctuaries and supply lines in neighboring Cambodia from which Hanoi's attacks were weekly inflicting hundreds of casualties on American soldiers. 181 Starting on March 18, 1969, B-52s bombed within several miles of Cambodian border. 182 Kissinger maintained that this bombing took place in in largely unpopulated areas. 183 Lasting until May 26, 1970 , these and similar measures undertaken later were deeply controversial at the time and have remained so for decades. All the criticisms of the Cambodian operations were magnified by the secrecy with which they were allegedly surrounded; Kissinger maintains that appropriate parties were properly informed throughout. 184 At home, Kissinger confronted potent anti-war forces. Numerous public and Congressional critics demanded prompt disengagement from Vietnam in return for the release of the American prisoners of war. On October 15 of that year, massive demonstrations took place around the country-20,000 in New York, 30,000 in New Haven, and 100,000 in Boston. 185 In 1971 and 1972, Congress passed, respectively, 72 and 35 non-binding resolutions demanding U.S. withdrawal. 186 Responding to the potent domestic backlash against the war, the Nixon Administration initiated regular troop withdrawals, hoping to keep the public united enough not to actively undercut the military efforts in Vietnam. President Nixon made the first decision to withdraw 25,000 troops on June 7, 1969, followed by 40,500 troops on September 16, 1969, 50,000 on December 15, 1969, and 150,000 on April 20, 1970. More withdrawals followed: 70,000 troops on January 13, 1972 and 12,000 on August 29, 1972 , which left 27,000 American soldiers in Vietnam. 187 Kissinger was convinced that Hanoi would seek to take battlefield advantage of the troop cuts that continually reduced U.S. military presence in Vietnam. He stated: "An enemy determined on protracted struggle could only be brought to compromise by being confronted by insuperable obstacles on the ground." 188 The North Vietnamese would draw out the negotiations while seeking a military victory. 189 In Nixon and Kissinger's judgment, the only way to keep up the military pressure on Hanoi, while satisfying the domestic demands for troop withdrawal, was to replace the departing troops with air and naval forces that were not included in the total troop numbers. 190 Kissinger negotiated for the first time with Le Duc Tho during three secret Paris meetings from February 20 to April 4, 1970. During the last of these sessions, Kissinger proposed a mutual U.S.-North Vietnamese withdrawal from South Vietnam within sixteen months. 191 On September 7, 1970, he went much farther than the April proposal: unlike the previous proposal, the U.S. was now prepared to leave no residual U.S. presence in South Vietnam. 192 Hanoi was unmoved, continuing to insist on U.S. complicity in effecting regime change in Saigon. 193 President Nixon's speech to the nation on October 7, 1970 positioned the United States as forthcoming and persistently seeking a negotiated settlement (at the public negotiating sessions, while, for the time being, keeping secret the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks), while accusing Hanoi as obstructing peace. 194 The President offered a cease-fire, including a halt to ongoing bombing, and a negotiation to agree on the timing and mode of U.S. withdrawal. The North Vietnamese quickly turned down the proposal. 195 The United States now took much more extensive steps to cut off the Vietcong insurgency's supply lines and sanctuaries in neighboring Cambodia and Laos. Hanoi had been using these routes and locations since the late 1950s to supply the Vietcong guerillas and to attack and kill thousands of South Vietnamese and American troops. 196 The United States invaded North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia in May 1970 and those in Laos in February and March 1971.
Kissinger regarded the ground invasions of Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries as strategically necessary to starve the Vietcong insurgency of support and to stop the attacks on American and South Vietnamese soldiers. U.S. anti-war critics, by contrast, condemned these actions as an unprovoked expansion of the war into neutral countries with dire long-term consequences for the region. Such critiques, often virulent, continue to the present day. 197 They further argue that the Cambodian invasion was militarily pointless and counterproductive by provoking the North Vietnamese into further aggression within Cambodia, undermining the Cambodian government, and eventually resulting in the brutal rule by the Khmer Rouge. 198 A corollary of this view is that Nixon and Kissinger purposefully misrepresented the efficacy of their Cambodia policy, keeping much of it secret. 199 By contrast, Kissinger believed a key front in the Vietnam War was Cambodia in which the North Vietnamese had been massively involved for years. One of the aims of the Cambodia operation was to signal to the North Vietnamese and its superpower supporters in Moscow and Beijing that the U.S. had the will and capacity to resist Hanoi's aggression by cutting off supplies to the Vietcong guerillas. 200 " We needed a strategy that made continuation of the war seem less attractive to Hanoi than a settlement," Kissinger reflected. 201 Kissinger likewise argues that the North Vietnamese expanded their Cambodian operation on their own irrespective of America's actions. 202 While previous offers envisioned a mutual U.S.-North Vietnamese withdrawal from South Vietnam, on May 31, 1971, Kissinger told Le Duc Tho that the United States was prepared to withdraw unilaterally in return for an end to North Vietnamese infiltration of Cambodia and Laos, which meant leaving the existing Vietcong and regular North Vietnamese formations in the South intact. 203 Again, Hanoi summarily rejected the offer.
Kissinger soon offered another concession. While in previous meetings he demanded that American prisoners be released before U.S. withdrawal, on August 16 he offered to withdraw U.S. troops at the same time as the prisoners were released as long as this did not involve the United States removing Saigon's government on the way out. 204 Hanoi rejected the offer.
Foreseeing a major North Vietnamese offensive against the South, Nixon and Kissinger sought to prepare the diplomatic ground for a powerful U.S. military response that they felt was necessary. 205 To accomplish this, Nixon needed to establish a record of reasonableness in negotiations. In his January 25, 1972 address to the nation, the President for the first time revealed the secret talks between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. After indicting Hanoi for rejecting the extremely forthcoming American peace proposals, Nixon offered to withdraw U.S. troops within six months. 206 However, he once again refused to overthrow the government in Saigon. 207 Kissinger shared the text of Nixon's January 25 speech with Moscow and Beijing, warning that the U.S. patience with North Vietnam was running low. 208 As expected, Hanoi launched a major offensive against the South on March 30, 1972. Nixon and Kissinger decided to respond forcefully, by mining North Vietnam's Haiphong harbor, thus starving Hanoi of Soviet supplies, and by undertaking a massive bombing of the roads and rail lines from China, which would be the preferred alternative route for supplies. 209 Seeking Chinese Assistance on Vietnam. Soon after coming into office, President Nixon and Kissinger acted on a historic opportunity to explore positive relations with Beijing, hoping to overcome the mutual hostility of the preceding years. 210 They capitalized on the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship, which had continued to sour since the mid-1960s with the Soviets increasing troop numbers from 12 to 40 divisions along the Sino-Soviet border. 211 In August 1969, indications appeared that the Soviets were considering bombing China's early-stage nuclear facilities. 212 A U.S. message to Moscow in early September 1969 warning against attacking China was a key early part of the effort to dispel Mao's original fear that the U.S. would cooperate with the USSR against China. 213 Yet, Kissinger needed to confirm that, at a minimum, China's close links to North Vietnam would not preclude a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement. As the relationship developed, Kissinger increasingly made clear to his Chinese interlocutors that U.S.-Chinese strategic cooperation was partially linked to China's assistance in reining in its North Vietnamese client-a point that was not lost on the Chinese. During the first meeting between Zhou Enlai and Kissinger, Zhou remarked about North Vietnam: "we still feel a deep and full sympathy for them." Kissinger noted afterwards: "Sympathy, of course, was not the same as political or military support; it was a delicate way to convey that China would not become involved militarily or press us diplomatically." 214 Kissinger judged better U.S.-Chinese relations to be intrinsically worthwhile. Yet a U.S. rapprochement with Beijing could also induce the Soviets to moderate their foreign policy behavior, especially their support of North Vietnam, in order to avoid provoking a closer Sino-U.S. collaboration against Moscow. Ideally, a U.S. move toward China would provide enough incentives to the Chinese to be cooperative (e.g., moderate their material support for North Vietnam, help to diplomatically isolate Hanoi), but not so much as to allow them to take the U.S. cooperation for granted. Since the U.S. attitude included both the prospect of improving relations and a possibility of reverting to the status quo, it tended to institutionalize the strategic dependence of the Chinese. 215 In practice, American diplomacy with China had three distinct effects on efforts to negotiate a settlement to the Vietnam conflict. First, unlike the Korean War, in which Chinese troops became directly involved in battles with American forces, China gave tacit (and true) assurances to Kissinger that its forces would not become similarly involved. Second, to an extent that is still debated, China softened its support for Hanoi and helped to isolate North Vietnam diplomatically. 216 Third, the threat of a developing U.S.-China axis led the Soviets to moderate their support for Hanoi.
Seeking Soviet Cooperation on Vietnam. Building on the developing rapprochement with China, Kissinger sought to persuade the Soviets to sharply reduce their diplomatic and military support for North Vietnam by threatening Moscow with abandoning détente and risking its potential benefits. 217 During the Johnson Administration, Kissinger assessed, the Soviets had not cooperated in helping to end the war because they had not borne meaningful costs for their support of North Vietnam. 218 Kissinger calculated that détente had already built up the Soviet "stake" in its bilateral relationship with the United States (which, Kissinger recognized, Moscow cultivated in part to counterbalance the burgeoning U.S. relationship with China) and that improvement thus far had whetted Moscow's appetite for further progress. 219 But how might this Soviet appetite be useful both with respect to arms control (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or SALT) and Vietnam? Kissinger saw a further potential source of U.S. leverage in its ability to offer (or block) progress toward resolving the long-simmering dispute between the Soviets and the western Allies over the status of Germany. This dispute had hampered Soviet efforts to expand valuable trade and diplomatic efforts with Europe. 220 This was the case since, after World War II, the four Allied powers-the United States, Soviet Union, France, and Britain-maintained military control over Germany. As a democratic West German state emerged alongside a pro-communist, Soviet-backed East German state, tensions had mounted between the two with the status of Berlin as its focus. 221 The three non-Soviet powers retained military control over West Berlin while the Soviets had walled off East Berlin. West Berliners were not recognized as citizens of the Bonn-based Federal Republic of Germany ("West Germany") . 222 Throughout the 1960s, with Berlin surrounded by East German territory and supported by vulnerable supply lines from the West, the West Germans and Allies refused to settle significant territorial disputes and wartime claims with the Soviets. Without a settlement, the Soviets' ability to trade, especially with West Europeans, was severely restricted.
In 1969, West German Prime Minister Willy Brandt began a concerted effort ("Ostkpolitik")-largely independent of Washington-to break the impasse with the Soviets. Brandt proposed a series of treaties to reduce tensions by opening trade agreements, resolving disputed territorial claims, and clarifying military arrangements. Brandt's initiative was largely motivated by his goal of keeping the dream of a unified German state alive (through engendering Soviet flexibility on this issue).57 Brandt's Ostkpolitik would earn him the Nobel Peace Prize, but Washington was deeply concerned that this policy might lead toward a neutral-possibly nationalist-Germany. Now Kissinger realized that it could be time to carefully soften American reservations about Ostpolitik (which the Soviets eagerly sought) in order to gain potential U.S. leverage on arms control and Vietnam.
A tangible opportunity for such leverage flowed from the so-called "Eastern Treaties," which would enable Moscow to relax its tensions with West Germany and, more broadly, in Europe. 223 Under the Eastern Treaties championed by Brandt-notably, the 1970 Treaty of Moscow between West Germany and the USSR-the signatories would normalize relations and renounce the use of military force. West Germany and the USSR signed the Moscow on August 12, 1970, though Germany still had to ratify it for the treaty to come into force. Given Brandt's somewhat shaky political situation, Moscow sought the U.S. help in pressing Bonn for prompt ratification (which Kissinger linked to a deal on Berlin). 224 Privately, Kissinger doubted that the U.S. could effectively intervene in West Germany's domestic politics. Publicly, however, he took advantage of Moscow's assumption that the American support was crucial to achieve German ratification.
During a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, Kissinger accused Moscow of "complicity" in Hanoi's March 1972 offensive against South Vietnam, and stated explicitly that the Soviet support for North Vietnam now posed grave difficulties for Washington to cooperate with Moscow on the Eastern treaties. 225 Lest the Soviets fail to get the seriousness of this message, Kissinger communicated the same point to Egon Bahr, Brandt's adviser, with the expectation that Bahr would pass the message to the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn. 226 Nixon's public revelations about American negotiating flexibility and major concessions in the Paris talks contrasted with North Vietnamese intransigence. At one point, Kissinger told Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that, "the Soviets had put themselves into the position where a miserable little country [North Vietnam] could jeopardize everything that had been negotiated for years." 227 Georgy Arbatov, a Soviet expert on American politics, advised five General Secretaries of the Soviet Union. "Kissinger thinks it was China that played the decisive role in getting us to feel the need to preserve our relationship with the U.S.A." Arbatov reflected, "But Berlin actually played a much bigger role, almost Copyright © 2016 James K. Sebenius a decisive one. Having the East German situation settled was most important to us, and we did not want to jeopardize that." 228 Kissinger used the impending May 1972 Soviet-American presidential summit in Moscow-which would include the signing of the SALT agreement-as another forcing point. During a pre-summit meeting with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow, he pointedly complained about the continued stalling tactics by the North Vietnamese and ended with a stern warning: "If this process is maintained we will act unilaterally at whatever risk to whatever relationship." 229 Kissinger knew, however, that Moscow was unlikely to exert decisive pressure on Hanoi. 230 At the same time, he explicitly articulated a major American concession to the Soviet leader that mirrored what he had been quietly signaling to Le Duc Tho: the United States would not demand a complete withdrawal of the regular North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam in return for the North Vietnamese relinquishing their demand to forcibly remove Thieu from power. 231 On May 9, Nixon announced the U.S. response to North Vietnam's March 1972 offensive against the South: the mining of the Haiphong harbor and the bombing of the transportation links from China. Along with these powerful military actions, he offered to withdraw all troops within four months. 232 In a tacit but clear concession of immense significance both to North Vietnam and Moscow, the President did not demand that the North Vietnamese regular forces withdraw as a condition for the end of bombing and mining. 233 Renewed domestic protests greeted Nixon's decision. 234 On the diplomatic front, major progress ensued. The Moscow summit took place, SALT Treaty was signed, and the USSR assumed a more restrained public posture vis-à-vis Hanoi. Privately, the Soviets did not meaningfully object to the American military actions while exerting a degree of pressure on Hanoi to be more forthcoming in negotiations. 235 Persuading South Vietnamese President Thieu to Agree. Expecting a breakthrough in the negotiations, Kissinger kept in contact with President Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon. 236 He did not, however, reveal the full extent of American concessions to Hanoi. Al Haig, Kissinger's military assistant, briefed Thieu in Saigon on August 17 on the emerging agreement and gave him a letter of reassurance from Nixon, who pledged continued support for Saigon after the war. 237 But it was not clear whether the South Vietnamese leader would eventually accept the agreement.
On October 8, 1972, Le Duc Tho dropped North Vietnam's longstanding demand for the United States to force regime change in Saigon as a condition for the deal. The provisional agreement included a ceasefire, the withdrawal of American forces, cessation of North Vietnamese infiltration of South Vietnam from Laos and Cambodia, and the release of the American prisoners of war. 238 Kissinger and his associates were privately jubilant at what finally appeared as the breakthrough they had sought. 239 Almost immediately, persuading President Thieu-using both threats and assurances-to accept the negotiated outcome became Kissinger's top priority. The threats-delivered orally and in writingcentered on the possibility of the complete cut-off of American aid in case Saigon refused to go along with the negotiated framework. 240 Along with the threats, Kissinger frequently communicated Nixon's assurances, which revolved around the President's stated determination to stand by its ally in Saigon in responding to the massive violations of the agreement by the North Vietnamese. 241 Nixon embodied the credibility of these promises and threats. Reelected in a massive 1972 landslide against the anti-war candidate George McGovern, he enjoyed a significant popular mandate. 242 "Our thinking," Kissinger remembered, "was that the agreement could be preserved unless the North Vietnamese launched another all-out offensive, in which case we believed that a combination of American air power and existing South Vietnamese ground forces could repeat the experience of '72 [the successful American and South Vietnamese military response to the March 30, 1972 North Vietnamese offensive]." 243 
ABM Treaty, 1972
Originally negotiated as part of the preliminary talks which led to the SALT I agreement, the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) treaty was ultimately separated from the larger agreement as a strategic concession in order to circumvent significant impediments to an overarching arms reduction agreement. Nevertheless, Kissinger negotiated the ABM in a roughly parallel fashion with SALT, reaching an accord with the USSR to limit both nations to two Anti-Ballistic Missile complexes with limitations of 100 ABMs per site.
China, 1971-2 (see above) Détente
Détente is the easing of political and military tensions between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America. The policy gained prominence in 1969 as an explicit strategy employed by Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon to address the nuclear weapons stalemate between both countries. During Kissinger's time as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State, the doctrine of détente formed the philosophical underpinning for the strategies that resulted in the SALT I and ABM treaties, the Helsinki Accords, and other significant agreements between the United States and USSR.
Helsinki Accords
A series of significant agreements on wide-ranging issues of importance between the USSR, the United States, and nearly three dozen European states, the Helsinki Accords were the result of a significant longrunning series of incremental forums and agreements begun in 1969. Directly a result of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) negotiations, the Accords, which were reached after a monthlong negotiation from July 1-August 1, 1975. Though not a binding treaty, the Helsinki Accords addressed a substantial number of military, economic, political, and human rights disagreements between the Eastern Bloc of Soviet-aligned nations and the participant members of NATO.
Israel-Syria Separation of Forces Agreement (1974) (see above) Nonproliferation Negotiations with Israel, South Korea and Pakistan
An ardent believer in the importance of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, Kissinger expressly undertook efforts to hinder the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons across the globe. Both as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State, Kissinger confronted Israeli, South Korean, and Pakistani leaders, opposing their attempts develop weapons. To do so, Kissinger employed all efforts at his disposal including sanctions, offers of incentives, and even threats to remove U.S. military protection for allies. 
Panama Canal Negotiations

Yom Kippur War Ceasefire (see above)
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